Is there a pecking order of cross-border investment in that countries become financially integrated primarily through some types of investment rather than others? Using a novel database of bilateral capital stocks for all types of investment -FDI, portfolio equity securities, debt securities as well as loans -for a broad set of 77 countries, we show that such a pecking order indeed exists. Motivated by the theoretical work on the capital structure of firms, the paper focuses on two key determinants of this pecking order: information frictions and the quality of host country institutions. Overall, we find that in particular FDI, and to some extent also loans, are substantially more sensitive to information frictions than investment in portfolio equity and debt securities. We also show that the share as well as the size of FDI that a country receive are largely insensitive to institutional factors in host countries, while portfolio investment is by far the most sensitive to the quality of institutions. This provides new evidence in favor of some hypotheses but contradicts others put forward in the theoretical literature on trade in financial assets.
Introduction
The perceived wisdom is that certain types of capital inflows are more beneficial for receiving countries than others. In particular, foreign direct investment (FDI) is generally seen as a "good" type of capital because it may promote growth in host countries by encouraging a transfer of technology and knowledge and by opening market access abroad (e.g. Aitken, Hanson and Harrison, 1997; Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee, 1998) . On the other hand, portfolio investment flows are considered to be more volatile, may exacerbate the magnitude of business cycles and also induce or at least worsen financial crises (e.g. Claessens, Dooley and Warner, 1995; Chuhan, Claessens and Mamingi, 1998; Sarno and Taylor, 1999) .
But other papers have challenged the view of considering FDI necessarily as "good cholesterol" (e.g. Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias, 2000, Albuquerque, 2003) . Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias show that actually the richest and least volatile economies, and countries with good institutions and well functioning markets, receive more foreign portfolio investment (FPI) and relatively less FDI from abroad as a fraction of total capital inflows.
Using a novel database of bilateral capital stocks, we confirm and extend this evidence in the present paper. Figure 1 , for instance, shows for a broad set of developed and emerging market economies (EMEs) that the poorest countries have the highest shares and the richest the lowest shares of FDI in total capital stocks. This difference is substantial and also robust to alternative country samples. This stylized fact -as well as several others discussed in detail in the paper -makes the important point that the type of foreign financing of cross-border investment does not pursue a random pattern, but follows a certain "pecking order". The main intended contribution of the paper is to test for the existence of such a pecking order of cross-border investment and to identify its determinants in a bilateral country-pair setting. We concentrate on two determinants that have been central in the literature on trade in financial assets in recent years: the role of information frictions, and the role of institutions as drivers of cross-border investment. Both are based on the theory of the capital structure of the firm, which goes back to the seminal work by Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Myres (1984) , allowing us to formulate the hypotheses for our empirical analysis.
Turning to the first of the determinants, information frictions have been at the core of the recent debate on international financial integration (e.g. Froot and Stein, 1991; Razin, Sadka and Yuen, 1998; Klein, Peek and Rosengren, 2002; Portes and Rey, 2005; Goldstein and Razin, 2005) . Much of the literature (e.g. Froot and Stein, 1991) argues that FDI should be more information intensive than other types of capital because it implies also a transfer of ownership and management responsibilities. By contrast, other papers claim that it is portfolio equity and to a certain extent also debt that should be more sensitive to information frictions rather than FDI or bank loans due to a lack of ownership control of the former (e.g. Razin, Sadka and Yuen, 1998) . Hence the theory linking the pecking order of cross-border investment and information frictions is not clear-cut, and it is ultimately an empirical question which of these hypotheses holds. As discussed in detail in section 2, the existing empirical literature has so far focused mostly on the effect of information frictions on one particular type of asset, rather than a comparison across assets. Our paper extends the analysis beyond individual assets and provides a systematic comparison between all the four different asset types of the capital account, thereby allowing us to formulate and test the pecking order hypothesis with regard to information frictions.
The existence and functioning of markets is a second important determinant of foreign investment, and which is closely linked to the effects of information asymmetries. If markets are absent or are functioning poorly, firms may have no other choice than to use FDI to carry out an investment project (Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias, 2000) . In this sense, FDI may function as a substitute for a functioning market mechanism. Thus, portfolio investment or bank loans may be preferred options for firms in an environment in which markets function well. In a broader sense, the quality of economic and political institutions is an analogy to the functioning of markets. In a country where property rights are poorly enforced and the risk of expropriation is high, firms may prefer FDI as it is harder to expropriate due to its information intensity and its inalienability (Albuquerque, 2003) . Moreover, different types of investment may react differently to factors such as the degree of corruption, the functioning of the legal system and transparency (e.g. Wei, 2000a; Faria and Mauro, 2004; Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozkan and Volosovych, 2005; Papaioannou, 2005) .
The paper tests the pecking order hypothesis of cross-border investment by developing and using a novel dataset on bilateral holdings of capital that covers all types of investment in the capital account -distinguishing between FDI, portfolio equity securities, portfolio debt securities and loans -for a broad set of 77 industrial and emerging market economies. One novelty of our approach is that it uses bilateral stocks, rather than flows, as we argue that stocks are the relevant concept for understanding the overall exposure and capital structure of countries and its composition. For our empirical model, we use a gravity-type model in a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) framework to test our hypotheses.
Two important overall results emerge from the empirical analysis. First, information frictions reduce the volume of capital inflows significantly for all types of capital. But they also have a substantial effect on the pecking order as we find that FDI and loans are the most sensitive and FPI equity and FPI debt securities the least sensitive types of investment to information frictions. For instance, a change in the distance among country pairs has a 1.5 to 2 times larger impact on FDI stocks and the holdings of loans than compared to FPI equity securities and debt securities. We use various proxies for information frictions -distance, the volume of bilateral telephone traffic, bilateral trade in newspapers and periodicals, and the stock of immigrants from the source country in the host -and find that this result is highly robust to all specifications. Moreover, these findings are robust to alternative specifications, such as including various other controls.
Second, the degree of market development has a substantial impact on the pecking order of financial integration. We find that portfolio investment is substantially more sensitive to the degree of market openness and development as well as to the quality of host country institutions than FDI or loans. For instance, capital account liberalization and financial development change the composition of financial liabilities of a country by raising the share of portfolio investment substantially. Moreover, we find that the volume of FDI and loans is relatively insensitive to market developments as, for instance, capital account liberalization does not have a statistically significant effect on the volume or stock of FDI or loans. This is in line with the evidence for capital flows of previous studies that use a different empirical strategy (see e.g. Montiel and Reinhart, 1999) .
Third, also the quality of economic and political institutions has a substantial impact on the composition of cross-border investment positions. We focus on three broad types of institutional indicators: the degree of transparency, investor protection and corruption. We find that portfolio investment is much more sensitive than FDI or loans to a broad set of institutional indicators, such as the degree of information disclosure in local credit market regulations, as well as accounting standards in the host country. Portfolio investment also reacts much more strongly to the risk of expropriation and repudiation costs, confirming the hypothesis put forward by Albuquerque (2003) . Other hypotheses of the literature are, however, not confirmed by our analysis. For instance, portfolio investment in particular, but also loans, change substantially with the degree of corruption. By contrast, the stock of FDI is found to be less sensitive to corruption, which is consistent with some findings in the literature (see Daude and Stein, 2004 ) but contrary to others (e.g. Wei, 2000b) , who are however using different country samples and usually focus on capital flows rather than stocks.
Overall, portfolio investment, and in particular equity securities, appear to be the most sensitive type of investment to market conditions and institutional factors. Our results prove robust to various alternative proxies of markets, institutions and country samples.
The findings of the paper have a number of policy implications. The paper underlines the role of information frictions as a barrier to financial integration, and in particular for FDI and loans. More importantly, the paper emphasizes that FDI should not necessarily be seen as an unconditional blessing for host countries. We present evidence that the share of inward FDI and also foreign loans is highest for countries with weak institutions and poorly developed or badly functioning capital markets. Therefore, although FDI may have beneficial effects on the economy, a composition of foreign investment that is heavily tilted towards FDI is likely to be a signal of some fundamental weaknesses of the host country economy, thus providing support for the argument of Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias (2000) .
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. The next section provides a brief and selective overview of the literature on the determinants of capital flows and the pecking order of financial integration. Section 3 then outlines the empirical methodology and presents the data, together with a number of stylized facts on cross-border investment. The empirical results are discussed in sections 4 and 5, including various robustness and sensitivity tests. Section 6 concludes and offers a short discussion of policy implications.
Literature on determinants of foreign investment and pecking order
In this section, we review the related literature. It is not our intention to give a detailed survey, but rather to discuss the relevant research questions and theories as guidance for our empirical analysis. Therefore, at the end of the section we point at the existing gaps in the empirical literature the present paper tries to fill.
From a theoretical viewpoint the relevance of the composition of the foreign investment position is closely linked to the theory on the capital structure of the firm. The classic work by Modigliani and Miller (1958) shows that in an environment of perfect information and in the absence of bankruptcy costs and taxes, the value of a firm is unaffected by how it is financed. Thus, much of the subsequent theoretical and empirical studies in the corporate finance literature have tried to identify which of these conditions is violated and leads to the empirical failure of the irrelevance theorem.
In particular asymmetric information has been a key explanation in the finance literature for the capital structure of the firm for the last twenty years. In their seminal papers Myres and Majlauf (1984) and Myres (1984) show that if external investors are less informed than insiders, new equity will be underpriced by the market. Thus, from the firm's viewpoint it would be more costly to raise funds using equity than internal funds. This establishes a "pecking order" theory of financing, where firms rank financial instruments according to the degree of information asymmetry and its subsequent extent of mispricing. There is a large empirical literature on information frictions and asset markets (for an excellent survey, see Harris and Raviv, 1991) . For example, Moskowitz (1999, 2001) show that mutual fund managers earn significantly more on investments in firms with headquarters located geographically near to the mutual fund's offices.
Information asymmetries are also the centre of attention of Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) who focus on understanding the home bias in international capital markets and analyze issues of capital taxation. In particular, in their model foreign investors face a proportional output cost -due to information asymmetries -compared to domestic investors, which reduces significantly the cross-border mobility of capital. Razin, Sadka and Yuen (1998) present a similar model that extends the pecking order argument to international capital flows to analyze issues of capital taxation. In particular, they assume that FDI circumvents the informational problems completely, while portfolio debt and equity are subject to informational asymmetries where domestic investors observe the real productivity of the firm, while foreign investors do not. Therefore, FDI is the preferred form of financing in the presence of information frictions, followed by portfolio debt and then equity. Neumann (2003) presents a version of lending with moral hazard model by Gertler and Rogoff (1990) that focuses on the differences between international debt and equity financing. In contrast to Razin, Sadka and Yuen (1998) , she assumes that ownership, even in the form portfolio equity, conveys some control and therefore information on the investment. Assuming that monitoring costs are decreasing in ownership, the implied pecking order is that FDI and equity are less costly ways of financing domestic investment than instruments that do not convey some degree of ownership and therefore information, like loans or debt. Goldstein and Razin (2005) present a model that tries to explain the differences in volatility of FDI versus FPI through information asymmetries. Again the key assumption is that FDI implies ownership control of the firm and therefore more information than FPI. In addition, FDI is subject to a fixed cost in contrast to FPI. They assume that foreign investors are subject to privately observed liquidity shocks which drive down the price of selling the asset before maturity due to a standard "lemons" problem. Thus, there is a trade-off between efficiency and liquidity for foreign investors. Under these conditions, they show that in equilibrium, if production costs are higher in developed countries, developed countries will receive more FPI that developing countries, given that it would be less profitable to pay the fixed cost associated to FDI. Mody, Razin and Sadka (2003) present a similar model that predicts also that more countries with good corporate governance attract more FPI.
Focusing on transaction costs, Martin and Rey (2004) analyze the effect of transaction costs in asset trade in a two-country model with financial assets. While their theory concentrates on the role of economies of scale and coordination failures in explaining financial market incompleteness, transaction costs are motivated to reflect information frictions between foreign and domestic investors. Although they do not focus on differences between types of foreign investment, the model gives a theoretical foundation to the application of "gravity" equations in the context of asset trade and therefore guidance for our empirical formulation.
On the empirical side, there is a fast growing empirical literature that tests the relevance of information frictions in international capital markets. Kang and Stulz (1997) show that nonJapanese investors hold disproportionately large shares in large firms in the tradable sector, with good accounting performance and low leverage. They argue that for this type of firms information frictions are the lowest. Similar results are obtained by Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) for the case of Sweden. Hau (2001) shows that investors based in Germany and in German speaking cities within Europe have higher profits on German stock. Informational advantages of domestic investors are also found by Choe, Khoe and Stulz (2004) for the case of Korea and Dvorak (2005) for Indonesia. Froot and Stein (1991) study the relationship between real exchange rate movements and foreign investment in a model where financial frictions are caused by costly information.
They show that the link between exchange rate movements and foreign investment should be stronger in assets that are intensive in information. When testing this prediction empirically for gross inflows into the United States, they find a significant link for FDI, while there is no significant link for treasury securities and equity. Thus, this evidence points at FDI being more sensitive to information asymmetries than FPI.
Two closely related papers, are Portes, Rey and Oh (2001) and Portes and Rey (2005) . Portes, Rey and Oh (2001) analyze the impact of information frictions on different types of crossborder portfolio flows in the United States, while the second analyzes only the determinants of equity flows. Both papers use the volume of telephone calls as well as the distance between the source and the host countries as proxies for information frictions.
1 They find a large negative and significant impact of distance and a positive impact of the volume of telephone traffic on asset trade. In addition, Portes, Rey and Oh (2001) find that in some specifications for more standardized financial assets like treasury bonds -assumed to be relatively less intensive in information -information frictions matter less than in the case of equity or corporate bonds. Related evidence for loans versus portfolio debt in a gravity model framework is presented in Buch (2002) .
The role of expropriation risk for the pecking order of cross-border investment is analyzed by Albuquerque (2003) . In his model, FDI is harder to expropriate than FPI because it contains more intangible assets. Therefore, countries with a higher expropriation risk and those that are more likely to face financial constraints, will receive more FDI than FPI. He presents some empirical evidence on overall gross capital inflows consistent with this theory. A similar argument has been provided by Hausmann and Fernández-Arias (2000) . In contrast, Wei (2000b) argues that FDI is more sensitive than portfolio and bank loans to corruption due to the need of permanent interaction with local officials and greater sunk costs. Using bilateral data of FDI flows and bank loans and a modified gravity model that includes source-country fixed effects, he finds that the ratio of bank lending to FDI is higher in countries with higher levels of corruption. Clearly, this is in contradiction with the evidence discussed previously.
This underlines the difficulty of testing simultaneously hypotheses related to host country effects, like institutions, capital controls or financial development and hypotheses related to the bilateral dimension, as information frictions. Therefore, a contribution of the present paper is to test in two steps these hypotheses, in order to assure consistent estimates in each step.
We also contribute to resolving the controversy on the effects of institutions and other host factors of the composition of capital positions.
Summing up, the discussion so far indicates several directions in which our paper extends the analysis. First, while the pecking order or sensitivity to information frictions is an important underlying assumption in several models that analyze the welfare consequences of the volume and composition of capital flows, it has not been tested systematically using all the different components of the capital account. As discussed above, most empirical studies focus on the determinants of one particular asset class or the difference between two classes. Therefore,
one contribution is that we analyze also FDI and bank loans in addition to portfolio equity and debt securities. Second, we use a larger sample than most studies and also include a wide range of bilateral variables that reflect transaction costs and are most likely correlated positively with information frictions omitted in most empirical studies. This omission might cause severe biases in the estimates, as well as conduct to false conclusions on the relevance or irrelevance of informational asymmetries. Third, we use foreign investment positions instead of flows. Portes, Rey and Oh (2001) use panel data of flows, but they recognize that most of the identification comes from the cross-sectional dimension. In addition, for any portfolio theory of foreign investment, like Martin and Rey (2004) , the relevant decision investors make is regarding the position they take in each country in their portfolio, given the cross-sectional distribution of information frictions they face. Therefore, using stocks instead of flows follows the theory more closely.
Methodology, data and some stylized facts
This section gives an outline of the methodology and the main hypotheses for the empirical analysis (section 3.1). The subsequent presentation of our data (section 3.2) is then followed by a discussion of some key stylized facts of the pecking order of financial integration derived from our data (section 3.3).
Methodology and hypotheses
The empirical analysis consists of two parts. In the first part, we attempt to understand the role of information frictions as a determinant of the pecking order of cross-border investment. Given that in our first step we want to identify consistently the effect of information frictions -a pair-effect variable -we also need to control for all other relevant factors that affect the volume of bilateral investment from a particular source country by including source and host country dummies as well as other bilateral controls that are likely to affect the level of bilateral investment. In the second step, we then try to explain the country fixed effects in order to understand which factors make host countries attractive places for investment. 
Our empirical analysis is cross-sectional, mainly as capital stocks change little from one year to the next and due to data availability. Hence the explanatory power of the model comes purely from the cross-section, which is sensible given the focus on capital stocks and the fact that the independent variables on information frictions and institutions are mostly changing little over time.
Note also that we estimate the model using k ij y as the stocks in US dollars of asset type k.
More precisely, we take the log value of the value in million US dollars and add one in order to be able to keep observations that are zero.
3 As there are several observations with a value of zero, it may raise the problem of censoring at zero. Although we use a tobit estimator and a two-step Heckman procedure to show that the results are largely robust to this specification, our preferred estimation technique is via seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) . This means that we estimate the four equations for each type of capital k simultaneously. The advantage of the SUR estimator is that it improves the efficiency of the estimates by allowing for crosscorrelations of the residuals of the four equations. Moreover, it allows us to directly test our pecking order hypothesis H 2 in the model.
Note that we do not "normalize" the dependent variable by dividing by host country GDP for H 1 on the volume effect or by dividing by total asset liabilities of host country j for H 2 on the pecking order effect, as is frequently done in the literature. The reason is that each of these "normalizations" imposes restrictions on the parameters of model that are unlikely to hold.
4
More generally, although it may seem appealing to exclude the fixed effects from the model in order to explicitly allow for including vectors of source country-specific variables X i and of host country-specific variables X j , this would imply excluding important unobserved components of relevant fixed effects and is likely to bias the estimators of interest β k . We show below that β k indeed mostly change substantially when excluding the fixed effects.
In the second part of the analysis, our aim is to understand the factors that explain the host country fixed effects. More precisely, we want to understand the role of markets and institutions in host countries as determinants of the pecking order of financial integration. As these factors are symmetric, i.e. investors in all source countries face the same conditions in a particular host country, we use the fixed effects obtained from the gravity model (1) to test for the role of host country institutions and market conditions X j on the pecking order and volume effects of financial integration:
where k j µ is an error term. Analogously to model (1), this specification allows us to formulate and test the two hypotheses with regard to the volume effect (H 3 ) and the pecking order effect (H 4 ) of markets and institutions:
3 However, in our final sample the number of zeros is relatively small. Out of the final 1116 observations, FDI values are all strictly positive, FPI portfolio has 187 zero observations, FPI debt 125, and Loans 84, respectively. Our results do not change if we drop these observations. While not reported here these regressions are available upon request. 4 To illustrate this point, assume we decomposed the host country fixed effect in model (1) as follows:,
where NORM j is the normalization variable, such as e.g. host-country GDP. In order for the normalization to be permissible, i.e. for NORMj to be moved to the left-hand-side of model (1), it would need to hold that η = 1. In reality, this may rarely be the case and we will show below that the empirical results change in some cases substantially when using such normalizations. 
Our preferred estimator is again the SUR, and the same caveats and discussion apply to this second stage as to the estimation of model (1).
Data
As the focus of the paper is on the pecking order of cross-border investment, our data is on stocks of various types of foreign investment, rather than capital flows per se. We use three different data sources to construct a comprehensive database that covers all four categories of the financial account -or what is still often referred to as the capital account; two terms which we use interchangeably throughout the paper -i.e. for FDI, for portfolio investmentdistinguishing also between equity and debt securities -and for loans.
For FDI, we use the UNCTAD database on bilateral FDI stocks. A database that is often employed in studies on FDI is the one provided by the OECD. However, the UNCATD database is more comprehensive as it includes both industrialized countries and developing countries. The UNCTAD data has annual entries in US dollars for around 90 reporting countries. Although the number of reporting countries is smallest for this database, the fact that it includes data not only for assets but also for liabilities allows us to obtain a proxy also for asset holdings of non-reporting countries vis-à-vis reporting countries.
There are several caveats that are present for the various data sources. A first potential caveat is that the data stems from different sources, thus raising the issue of how comparable they are, though the definitions used are the same across sources. Moreover, one potentially important issue is that the data collection is generally based on the residence principle. This may imply that countries may report their asset holdings vis-à-vis their direct counterpart country but not vis-à-vis the country where the financial asset is ultimately invested. This of course would give enormous importance to financial centers as a lot of capital is channeled through these, but do not reflect the true bilateral holdings of financial assets. Hence we exclude financial centers from our analysis.
Moreover, note that our empirical analysis is purely cross-sectional for two reasons: due to the fact that capital stocks obviously change little from one year to the next and also due to while in the case of the developed countries FDI amounts only to 22%. In contrast, the share of portfolio equity and portfolio debt holdings is significantly higher for developed countries.
Some stylized facts on the pecking order
Second, in terms of the volume of investments, developed countries receive significantly higher volumes of all types of capital. Developed countries receive on average -as a ratio of their GDP -around 2.5 times more FPI portfolio, 6.6 times more FPI debt, 2 times more loans, and 1.3 times more FDI than developing countries. Tables 1 and 2   Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients and their significance of investment shares with regard to selected indicators of income, market development and institutions. First, there is a large negative correlation of -0.38 between the share of FDI instocks in total capital stocks and per capita income of a country. Loans are also negatively correlated, though the correlation coefficient is not statistically significant. The same finding applies to domestic financial market development -as proxied by the degree of capital account liberalization and by the ratio of credit to the private sector as percent of GDP: the more developed financial markets are, the lower the shares of FDI and loans a country receives. Figure 2 illustrates in more detail the relationships between these different types of capital and per capita GDP.
Moreover, countries with a higher risk of expropriation receive a significantly higher share of FDI and loans. Overall, these stylized facts provide some first, descriptive evidence that there is indeed a significant pecking order in cross-border investment, as the various types of foreign capital stocks are strongly correlated with indicators of market development and institutions. A detailed analysis of the causality underlying these relationships is provided in the subsequent sections.
The pecking order and the role of information frictions
We now turn to our econometric results. We start with the analysis of the role of information frictions (section 4), before presenting the findings with regard to the role of markets and institutions (section 5).
Benchmark results
What is the role of information frictions in explaining the pecking order of financial integration? A first important issue is how to measure information frictions. We start by following the common practice in the literature both on trade in goods and on trade in financial assets and proxy information frictions through the log geographic distance between country pairs. We then proceed by using various alternative measures for information. Table 3 shows the results of our benchmark model (1), which includes in addition to distance a set of standard gravity variables, such as dummy variables on whether or not the two countries have a common language, have a common legal origin, colonial links, and whether they have a trade agreement or a joint investment treaty to facilitate cross-border investment.
The results are compelling both with regard to our hypothesis H 2 about the pecking order of financial integration as well as with regard to the volume effects hypothesis H 1 . Table 3 FDI and loans are substantially more sensible to changes in distance than portfolio equity and portfolio debt investment. The differences in the effects are sizeable as the coefficients for FDI and loans are both around -1.2 as compared to point estimates of -0.67 and -0.80 for portfolio equity and debt. Also, these differences are highly statistically significant as shown in the right-hand-side columns of the table.
It is interesting to point out that the size of the estimated coefficients for distance is in line with the empirical literature on trade in assets, e.g. Portes and Rey (2005) report a coefficient of -0.89. In addition, the effect of distance on asset trade is greater than its effect on trade in goods, which according to Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) is mostly around -0.6. In the case of goods, Grossman (1998) shows that for sensible values of transportation costs, the distance elasticity should be around -0.03. 7 Thus, he concludes that information costs must be behind the empirical result that the effect is around 20 times larger. For trade in assets it therefore seems that the case for distance reflecting information rather than trade costs is even more compelling. Thus, we explore this information hypothesis in more detail below.
The point estimates for the variables on what is often referred to as "familiarity" effects are sensible as they have the correct sign and are mostly statistically significant. Like for the distance variable, FDI reacts much more strongly to these familiarity effects than this is the case for portfolio equity and debt investment. For instance, when both countries speak the same language FDI stocks in host countries are 54 percent higher and portfolio equity investment 38 percent larger, whereas portfolio debt investment and loans are not statistically significantly different. 
Robustness: alternative proxies for information frictions
How robust are these findings to different proxies for information frictions? Clearly, it may seem odd to proxy information frictions for trade in financial assets through geographic distance as one would expect that geography should have little to do with financial transactions. However, the literature on capital flows has repeatedly found distance to be highly significant, see e.g. Portes and Rey (2005) for equity flows. Nevertheless, it is useful to employ alternative and ideally more direct proxies for information frictions. We use three proxies: the amount of telephone traffic between two countries, the trade in newspapers, and bilateral stock of immigrants from the source country that live in the host country and vice versa.
The intuition for the use of these variables as proxies for the degree of information frictions is straightforward. The volume of telephone call traffic was proposed first by Portes and Rey (2005) and has been used extensively in the most recent empirical literature. 9 Telephone traffic is a proxy of the amount of information that flows between both countries and it is assumed that a larger volume of information flows -controlling additionally for the size of both economies -implies less informational frictions. A similar rationale has been put forward to use trade in newspapers and periodicals by Nicita and Olarreaga (2000) to study information spillovers in goods markets. They report a high correlation of trade in newspapers with telephone traffic (a simple correlation of 0.77), but prefer their measure due to a greater data availability. Finally, Gould (1994) analyzes the impact of the stock of immigrants in the U.S. on trade between the U.S. and the immigrants' country of origin. The intuition is that immigrants have better information on the markets and institutions in their home country which would lower transaction costs. Table 4 shows the results when adding telephone traffic to the benchmark model. One important result is that when adding telephone traffic it is not only highly significant, but distance becomes insignificant for FDI and portfolio equity and debt investment. Distance retains its significance for loans, albeit with a much smaller coefficient of -0.34 as compared to -1.23 in the benchmark model of Table 3 . It is important to point out that this result is not driven by multicollinearity problems between telephone traffic and distance, given that the simple correlation between both variables in our sample is just -0.13. In addition, although the sample is reduced due the availability restrictions on telephone traffic, if we re-estimate the regression from Table 3 for this sub-sample, the distance coefficients are negative, significant, and not different from the estimates for the whole sample. Therefore, distance seems to be a proxy for overall information frictions in asset trade. When comparing the pecking order effect of information frictions, telephone traffic is again significantly larger for FDI and also loans than for equity and debt. Tables 4 -5   Table 5 gives the estimates for the other two alternative information proxies as well as for a model that instead includes the first principal component of the three proxies. We include the principal component of all three alternative proxies because it may help alleviate measurement errors related to each individual variable. 10 The results confirm that FDI and loans are more sensitive to information frictions. However, distance remains significant in most of these specifications, and with the same order as before as information generally has the largest effects on FDI and loans and the smallest impact on portfolio equity and debt.
Robustness: Alternative model specifications and controls
Finally, we conduct a battery of sensitivity tests by using alternative econometric specification and by adding various controls to the empirical specification of the model. A first test is to ask whether the results are robust to taking ratios, of GDP or of total capital stocks, as dependent variables, which is a commonly done in the literature, despite the controversial underlying assumptions behind such a specification, as discussed in section 3.1. FDI and loans are in both specifications significantly and substantially larger than portfolio equity and portfolio debt investment. Table 6 As the next step, we investigate the robustness of the results to using alternative econometric estimators. Table 7 Tables 7 -9 There are some interesting differences between the models with and without fixed effects.
The model without fixed effects is estimated by including nominal GDP (in US dollar) and population of both the source country and of the host country instead of the fixed effects.
There are two important points to note from the results. First, almost all point estimates for the proxies of information frictions are substantially different from those of the benchmark fixed-effects model. This lends support to our point made above that it is important to estimate the model by including fixed effects as otherwise the point estimates are biased due to omitted variables. Nevertheless, even without the fixed effects our pecking order hypothesis is confirmed. Second, note that the hypothesis that the point estimates of the GDP variables are equal to one is rejected in almost all equations. This is a noteworthy fact because it stresses that a "normalization" of the model, i.e. including the dependent variables as ratios of GDP imposes incorrect restrictions on the parameters of the model.
In Table 8 we explore an alternative way to deal with observations that are zero. Razin, Rubinstein and Sadka (2005) argue that in the presence of fixed costs, the correct way of dealing with the censoring problem is to use Heckman's (1979) two-step procedure. It might be that fixed costs are much higher for one particular type of investment and therefore our previous results could potentially be biased. In order to explore this possibility, we proceeded in the following way. We estimated the first-step "selection" equation using probit. Our dependent variable in each case is a dummy of whether investment is greater than zero or not.
The explanatory variables in this step are all of our baseline variables, including the source and host country dummies. In the second step, we considered the log of the different types of investment positions, rather than log (1+y ij ), and estimated the equation correcting for the potential selection bias. 11 The necessary exclusion restrictions in each equation were selected based on the insignificance of these variables in the respective regressions in Table 3 . While the point estimates for portfolio debt and equity are slightly higher than under our baseline specification, it is clear that the previously found pecking order still holds.
One set of explanations that we have not analyzed so far is risk sharing or risk diversification
as a driver of cross-border investment. As discussed in section 2, there is a large literature on the determinants of risk sharing and home bias. Thus the motivation for the type and direction of cross-border capital flows may not only be information frictions and institutions but also the attempt to diversify idiosyncratic, home-country risk. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) , Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) and Aviat and Courdacier (2005) argue that a source country that receives a high share of its imports from a particular host country will want to acquire more capital in this specific host country in order to ensure itself against terms of trade shocks to this country. Extending this argument to risk diversification, it may be optimal for investors to invest relatively more in those countries with the lowest or even a negative degree of output correlation to its own.
We therefore add to our benchmark model imports of source country i from host country j (see left panel of Table 9 ) and GDP correlation between the two countries for (right panel of Table 9 ) to investigate whether the findings for information frictions change when controlling for proxies of risk sharing. The table shows that trade is indeed positively correlated with all four types of capital investment. GDP correlation, by contrast, is significant and positive only for cross-border investment in debt securities. It is important to stress that trade and GDP correlations are obviously likely to be endogenous to financial 11 Given that we do not have zero observations for FDI in our sample, the Heckman two-step procedure does not apply. Therefore, we report the OLS estimate using the log of FDI as dependent variable.
integration and one would need to find suitable instruments if one wanted to investigate the link between risk sharing and financial integration. However, the important point to note for the objective of this paper is that information frictions as proxied by distance (or other information proxies when substituted for distance) retain their significance and the pecking order of FDI and loans to be the most sensitive to information frictions and portfolio investment the least sensitive is confirmed.
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Overall, the first key result that we take from this section is that there is a clear pecking order with regard to information frictions. FDI and loans are substantially more sensitive to information frictions than portfolio investment. The differences are large and statistically significant. These findings are also robust to several alternative proxies for information frictions, in particular when using telephone traffic. Moreover, various robustness tests confirm the specification of the model and underline the robustness of the results on the pecking order hypothesis to alternative specifications and different econometric estimators.
Thus, the results indicate that FDI and loans are more sensitive to information frictions -or more information-intensive -than portfolio investment, equity and debt. A possible explanation for this fact is that FDI and loans in general require frequent interaction and a deeper knowledge of the markets where they operate. Also, especially for the case of FDI, once an asset has been acquired, direct ownership makes the asset less liquid given the potential lemon problem in case of a re-sale as Goldstein and Razin (2005) point out. Thus, FDI becomes partially irreversible or costlier to liquidate, and therefore more sensitive to information in the first place.
The pecking order and the role of institutions and financial market development
We now turn to the role of financial markets and institutions. The central focus is on the question of whether we can identify a pecking order of financial integration with regard to the degree of development and openness of markets and the quality of institutions in the host country. For this purpose, we extract the host country fixed effects from model (1) and then estimate model (2), i.e. we attempt to explain the host country fixed effects through market conditions and institutions. Note that given the specification of model (1) where the dependent variable is measured in value terms, we need to control for size effects in model (2). We do so by including host country GDP in each of the specifications below, though we 12 As a final check, we find that the results are robust to using alternative country samples, i.e. our pecking order hypothesis in that FDI and loans are most sensitive to information frictions is confirmed for both emerging market countries as well as industrialized countries. Results are available upon request.
omit showing the point estimates for this variable for brevity reasons. All variables used are described in more detail in Appendix B.
We start with the role of market development and openness. We use three different proxies.
First, we employ a capital account openness dummy. This dummy takes the value of one if the country had fully liberalized its capital account by the mid-1990s, and is zero otherwise.
Data for this variable comes from the IMF's Annual Report of Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). The finding is remarkably strong as portfolio equity and portfolio debt investment react strongly to capital account openness, whereas the coefficients for FDI and loans are positive but only marginally statistically significant (see Table 10 ). The magnitude of the effects is large: a country that is open receives about 80% more equity capital and 80% more debt investment compared to an economy with a closed capital account.
13 Table 10 Second, we investigate the effect of the development of the domestic financial sector on the pecking order. We include credit to the private sector as a proxy for financial development. Table 10 shows that the elasticities are by the far the largest for equity investment, which is about twice as large as that for debt securities and FDI. These differences are statistically significant, while in the case of FDI investment appears to not react to changes in the degree of financial market development in the host country.
Third, we analyze the role of the development of the local stock market, and proxy this through stock market capitalization. The bottom panel of Table 10 indicates again that equity investment is most strongly related to changes in market capitalization but nevertheless also cross-border investment in debt securities, loans and FDI react, though to a lesser extent. We test the effect of various institutional features. While it is hard to determine which institutional factors to focus on, we are guided in our choice of institutional variables by the mostly theoretical literature discussed in section 2. The sources for these variables are manifold, partly stemming from the work by La Porta et al. (1998) , Djankov et al. (2002) and partly from the databases by the World Bank Doing Business and by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Table 11 Tables 10 and 11 show the findings for three sets of institutional variables. First, we look at the role of transparency. For this, we employ both a measure on the quality of information disclosure and on the quality of the accounting standards required by law in the host countrywith higher values indicating a better quality. For both measures, portfolio equity investment reacts the strongest to changes in these transparency measures, while in the case of accounting standards the coefficient for debt securities and loans are also significant at a 10% level. FDI and loans are the least responsive. In fact, the elasticity of equity investment is about three times larger than that for FDI and for loans.
Second, we analyze the role of investor protection (last regression in Table 10 and Table 11 ).
In particular, a lower risk of expropriation -indicated by a higher value of the variable in the table -has a highly significant impact mainly on portfolio investment. By contrast, the elasticity of loans is only about one half of that of portfolio investment, while FDI does not react at all to differences in expropriation risk. This finding thus provides strong support for the hypothesis formulated by Albuquerque (2003) and is line with the stylized facts presented above in section 3.
Moreover, Table 10 shows that an improvement in the quality of property rights -indicated by a decline in the variable in the table -has a significant and the largest impact on portfolio equity and debt investment, a lower effect on loans, but no effect on FDI. An almost identical picture emerges for repudiation costs and for the quality of enforcement of laws and regulations -which is measured in the days it takes to enforce a particular ruling, so that a higher number for the latter indicates a worse system of enforcement. Overall, all three measures therefore indicate that investor protection has the largest effect on portfolio investment but does not appear to have any significant effect on FDI stocks.
Third, we analyze the importance of corruption for the pecking order. We use three alternative proxies for corruption; a first one from Transparency International, a second one from the World Development Report of the World Bank and the third one from a survey of German manufacturing firms. All three indicators have been used previously by Wei (2000b) .
In all cases, a higher value indicates a higher degree of corruption. Overall, the same finding emerges for all three of the proxies: corruption has the strongest negative effect on portfolio investment and some, though smaller effect on loans. Importantly, corruption does not appear to have any significant effect on FDI, and this result holds for all three measures of corruption. This finding is in line with Daude and Stein (2004) who do not find a robust relation between different corruption indicators and FDI in contrast to other institutional indicators.
We conduct various sensitivity tests to check for the robustness of these findings. For instance, we find very similar results when controlling also for GDP per capita in model (2).
The stylized facts of section 3 underline that there is a high correlation between per capita GDP and the pecking order of financial integration. However, the fact that the results hold also when controlling for GDP per capita stresses that market development and institutions have a large and significant effect on the pecking order independent of the level of development of a country. Tables 12 -13 As a further important sensitivity test, we use an IV estimator to take into account the possibility that institutional arrangements and market development may be endogenous to financial integration. We estimate the system using a three-stage least square estimator (3SLS), which in essence implies instrumenting the institutional variables. An additional advantage of this approach is that we also address potential measurement errors in the institutional variables with our estimation technique. We draw our instruments from the literature on law and finance and the literature on institutions and economic development.
Specifically, we use legal origin dummies and dummies for religion which have been found to be important determinants of financial markets development and regulations (see La Porta et al. 1997 Porta et al. , 1998 . In addition, we test the absolute latitude, from Hall and Jones (1999) , as an alternative instrument for institutions.
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The results for the 3SLS estimates are given in Tables 12 and 13 . Overall, the key point is that the results are highly robust to those without instrumenting the institutions. All the results described above are qualitatively identical when using 3SLS, underlining that portfolio investment is substantially more sensitive to institutions and market development than FDI, and to some extent also than loans. Moreover, the fact that the size of the coefficients and their significance increase somewhat also helps to stress the robustness of the results.
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In summary, we find that market development and institutions are strongly related to the pecking order of cross-border investment. The key finding of this section is that portfolio investment, in particular in equity securities, is the type of capital that is the most sensitive to 14 Using as alternative instruments the mortality rates of settlers from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) or ethnolinguistic fragmentation from Easterly and Levine (1997) does not alter the qualitative results of our analysis, While not presented here, the regressions using these instruments as well as OLS regressions are available upon request. 15 Finally, we also find that the results are largely robust across country sub-samples, i.e. when only analyzing emerging markets/developing countries, with few qualitatively meaningful differences across these groups. Results are available upon request. differences in market development/openness and the quality of host country institutions. A second key result is that FDI appears to be the type of capital that is most immune to the quality of domestic institutions. We find that FDI is least sensitive in all institutional categories, including with regard to transparency, investor protection, to the degree of corruption and to expropriation risk.
Conclusions
Is there a pecking order of cross-border investment in that countries become financially integrated primarily through one type of investment rather than others? The perceived wisdom in much of the debate on financial integration and trade in financial assets is that FDI constitutes a type of investment that is desirable from a host country perspective because it brings about a transfer of know-how, creates access to foreign markets and reduces the risks of financial distress. However, the facts of financial integration also show that countries that are richer, have higher growth and better institutions receive a higher share of their foreign investment in the form of portfolio investment and a much lower share through FDI and loans.
The objective of this paper has been to analyze whether there is a natural pecking order in cross-border investment. We focus on the role of two key determinants for the trade in financial assets that have been central in this literature in recent years: the importance of information frictions, and the role of institutions. Both are based on the theory of the capital structure of the firm that goes back to the seminal work by Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Myres (1984) . Recent theoretical contributions to this literature emphasize the importance of differences in the ownership structure of different forms of investment. In particular, FDI has stronger ownership implications and thus tends to be more information sensitive than portfolio equity or debt investment. A second strand of the literature has focused on the implications of this theory for the role of institutions. One line of reasoning is that due to the larger information sensitivity of FDI, it is also harder to expropriate and thus it may be more immune to differences in the quality of institutions and market development.
The intended contribution of the paper is to test these hypotheses empirically for a broad set of countries. To our knowledge, this is the first paper that provides a comprehensive comparison of all four types of cross-border investment -distinguishing between FDI, portfolio equity securities, debt securities as well as loans. We develop and use a unique, combined data source of the capital stocks, rather than capital flows, for 77 countries.
The empirical results are compelling and confirm our hypotheses on the pecking order of cross-border investment. First, information frictions across countries are an important determinant of the pecking order of financial integration. In line with the theory on the capital structure of the firm, we find that FDI, and to some extent loans, are the most sensitive types of capital to information frictions, whereas portfolio investment is much less responsive. The magnitude of these pecking order effects is large: FDI and loans are about 1.5 to 2 times more sensitive to information frictions than equity and portfolio investment. This finding is robust to several sensitivity tests, including the use of alternative proxies for information frictions;
various specifications of the econometric model; controlling for other determinants, such as risk diversification; and across country samples, both for industrialized and for emerging market economies.
The second key result of the paper is that the degree of market development and the quality of host country institutions are important determinants of the pecking order of cross-border investment. We find that portfolio investment is substantially more sensitive than FDI and loans to both market development -such as the openness of the capital account and the development of the domestic financial sector -and to domestic institutional features. We use three proxies for the quality of institutions -the degree of transparency, investor protection and corruption -and show that this result is robust across all these different elements of host country institutions. These results confirm some hypotheses formulated in the literature but contradict others. For instance, in line with the argument by Albuquerque (2003) , we find that FDI does not react to differences to the risk of expropriation, whereas portfolio equity and debt investment is highly sensitive to this risk. Similarly, we do not find that corruption has a more detrimental effect on FDI, as hypothesized in the literature, but that the magnitude of FDI is not sensitive to corruption, whereas portfolio investment is. This implies that in fact corruption tilts the composition of foreign investment significantly towards FDI, and to a lesser extent towards loans.
The findings of the paper have a number of important policy implications. In particular, the empirical results indicate that a large share of foreign investment that takes the form of FDIdespite the various benefits FDI may ultimately entail -may not necessarily be a blessing, but may in fact also be a signal of some underlying weaknesses -either in terms of weak institutions or in terms of the poor functioning or underdevelopment of domestic financial markets -of the host country. By contrast, a large share of foreign investment that comes through portfolio equity or debt securities is likely, at least in part, to signal well-functioning domestic financial markets and the trust of foreign investors in domestic institutions. World Bank -Doing Business Database TI corruption -value of index goes from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating higher levels of corruption Transparency International (Wei, 2000b ) WDR corruption -index goes from 1 to 8, with higher values indicating higher levels of corruption World Bank (Wei, 2000b) German exporters' corruption index -survey based index that goes from 0 to 10. Higher values represent higher levels of corruption Wei (2000b) vs.
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FDI FPI equity FPI debt Loans
Notes: The underlying econometric model is that of (1) Notes: The underlying econometric model is that of (1) 
Notes: The underlying econometric model is that of (1): Notes: The underlying econometric model is that of (1):
The superscripted letters indicate for the pecking order hypothesis:
, that the respective coefficient is different to that of FDI for F , different to that of equity portfolio investment for E , different to that of debt securities for D and different to that of loans for L . ***,**,* show statistical significance of the coefficients at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively. Notes: The underlying econometric model is that of (1) , that the respective coefficient is different to that of FDI for F , different to that of equity portfolio investment for E , different to that of debt securities for D and different to that of loans for L . Note that no such tests are possible for the tobit specification because it is not estimated as a system of equations. ***,**,* show statistical significance of the coefficients at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively. Notes: The underlying econometric model is that of (1) , that the respective coefficient is different to that of FDI for F , different to that of equity portfolio investment for E , different to that of debt securities for D and different to that of loans for L . ***,**,* show statistical significance of the coefficients at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively. Notes: The underlying econometric model is that of (2) , different to that of equity portfolio investment for E , different to that of debt securities for D and different to that of loans for L . ***,**,* show statistical significance of the coefficients at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively. 
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